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ABSTRACT 
 
This study reassesses the common belief that terrorist attacks destabilize financial markets, 
by analyzing event studies covering 10,576 individual attacks and 141,665 nonattack days 
across 72 stock and foreign exchange markets in 36 countries from 1996 to 2015. The meta-
analysis reveals that terrorist attacks have almost no impact on stock markets and only 
marginal effect on foreign exchange markets, though effects vary with individual attacks and 
markets. The number of fatalities slightly raises the likelihood of adverse impact, while the 
number of wounded and the magnitude of recent attacks slightly decrease it. The markets are 
hit less hard when attack-day returns are positive, but variance is more likely to increase in 
the short term. Also, the impact of an attack is stronger when the market is performing 
extremely well or poorly.  
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1. Introduction 
The effects of terrorism on financial markets have not received much attention from 
academics and policy makers until recently, despite the common belief that terrorist attacks 
can lower prices while creating uncertainty about the future and consequently increasing 
market volatility. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 changed the scope of terrorism as a 
geopolitical risk that threatens the global economy and financial markets, the existing 
literature has mainly focused on a very limited number of terrorist events, particularly the 
9/11 U.S. attacks in 2001, the 3/4 Madrid bombings in 2004, the 7/7 London bombings in 
2005, and the 11/13 Paris attacks in 2015. Most studies use the event study method and 
regression models and focus on stock markets, and less frequently on foreign exchange and 
other financial markets. 
Karolyi (2006) surveys the earlier research, most of which focused on a single episode 
like the 9/11 attacks, and concludes that terrorist attacks are associated with negative 
abnormal market returns. Likewise, other single-country studies, which usually adopt 
regression models, conclude that terrorist attacks hurt financial markets. For example, Eldor 
and Melnick (2004) investigate the stock and foreign exchange markets in Israel using linear 
regression models and reveal significant negative impact on returns. Aslam and Kang (2013), 
using a similar model, show significant negative stock return just after terrorist attacks in 
Pakistan. Mansoor and colleagues (2017) reveal that terrorist attacks depreciate Turkish 
currency.   
Most of the studies that cover a wider range of countries or attacks also present 
evidence of adverse impacts. For instance, Chen and Siems (2004) adopt the event study 
method and show that the majority of 36 stock indices reacted negatively to the 9/11 attack. 
Arin, Ciferri, and Spagnolo (2008) report that all of the six stock markets they tested 
(Indonesia, Israel, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, and the UK) suffered from decreasing returns 
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after terrorist attacks. Johnston and Nedelescu (2005), also using event studies, conclude that 
the 9/11 and 3/4 Madrid attacks had predominantly negative impacts on the financial sectors 
of 14 countries. Chesney and colleagues (2011), using both event studies and regression 
models, investigate 77 attacks in 25 countries and show that two-thirds of the attacks 
decreased market returns in at least one stock market. The scale of adverse impact may differ 
with the characteristics of specific financial markets (Johnston & Nedelescu, 2005) and 
attacks (Eldor & Melnick, 2004; Karolyi & Martell, 2006). On the other hand, their impact on 
the economy in general is estimated as negative (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Eckstein & 
Tsiddon, 2004; Shahzad, Zakaria, Rehman, Ahmed, & Fida, 2016), and company-targeted 
attacks also decrease the company’s share prices (Karolyi & Martell, 2006).   
Studies on volatility are relatively rare and commonly use volatility regression 
models. They mostly agree that terrorist attacks increase market volatility. For instance, Arin 
et al. (2008) and Chuliá et al. (2009) show that terrorist attacks predominantly destabilize 
financial markets. Increased volatility after attacks may last longer than a week at both 
country (Mnasri & Nechi, 2016) and firm levels (Essaddam & Karagianis, 2014).   
In contrast, other studies argue that adverse impacts do not always occur. Chen and 
Siems (2004) examine the response of U.S. stock markets to 14 attacks, but find no evidence 
of lowered returns. They conclude that U.S. financial markets are more flexible and liquid 
and recover quicker than other global financial markets; hence the minimal reaction to 
terrorist attacks. Kollias, Papadamou, and Stagiannis (2011) present similar evidence of the 
flexibility of the UK stock market compared with the relatively smaller Spanish stock market. 
Brounrn and Derwall (2010) find that the impact of terrorist attacks other than the 9/11 attack 
seems mild and brief if there is any, and Kollias, Manou, Papadamou, and Stagiannis (2011) 
find that whether the markets react to attacks depends on the attributes of the individual 
attack. Looking at 21 foreign exchange markets, Narayan and colleagues (2017) show that 
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market reactions are diverse in terms of appreciation and depreciation of currencies.  
This contrasting evidence may arise because comprehensive research on a large 
number of attacks and their impacts on financial markets is still in its infancy, despite the 
hundreds of terrorist attacks happening globally each year. Studies on foreign exchange or 
other financial markets are rare. Both popular methods, event studies and regression models, 
have been used on a small number of well-known attacks and markets. The event studies 
rarely make any comparison with nonattack days, and almost all the regression-based studies 
examine the conditional mean of market returns rather than the different parts of return 
distribution, e.g., median or quantiles of return distribution. The only exception is the study 
by Chesney et al. (2011), one of whose methods is based on value at risk (i.e., the lower tail). 
Further meta-analysis, for example to test the significant impact of attack days against 
nonattack days or to find what determines the impact of terrorist attacks, is rarely carried out.  
Therefore, we intend to answer the following research questions: (1) Do terrorist 
attacks decrease stock returns or the value of domestic currency, or increase the variance of 
returns? (2) Does a large-scale attack have a higher chance of harming markets? (3) What 
attributes of the attack and the market determine whether a particular terrorist attack has an 
adverse impact? (4) Do terrorist attacks differently affect strong or weak markets? 
This study makes four contributions. First, we explore one of the most comprehensive 
datasets, covering 10,576 individual terrorist attacks across 72 stock and foreign exchange 
markets between 1996 and 2015. Second, we reanalyze the results of event studies to verify 
the adverse impact of terrorist attacks and also to find the determinants. Third, we compare 
results for attack days with those for nonattack days and those from volatility models to 
check that our findings are robust. Last, we use a quantile regression model to see how 
terrorist attacks affect different return quantiles.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset, 
  
6 
 
which includes data on both terrorist attacks and financial markets. Section 3 explains the 
method and Section 4 reports the results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Data  
In this study, the stock market and the foreign exchange market are represented by the 
price index of a country’s main stock market and its real effective exchange rate (REER), 
observed daily for 36 countries over the period from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2015 
(Table 1).1 The five strongest performers in the stock markets are Indonesia, Mexico, India, 
Denmark, and South Africa, while the value of domestic currencies increases by the largest 
percentage in the Czech Republic, Switzerland, China, the United States, and Israel. The 
financial market statistics (market capitalization, the value of stock traded, and the turnover 
of the stock markets) are obtained from the World Bank, and the geographical distribution of 
foreign currency turnover is from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS, 2016).  
A total of 10,833 terrorist attack days during the same period are collected from the 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the most extensive dataset of terrorism attacks, 
maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism at the University of Maryland, United States. This database is time-stamped only 
by year, month, and day, so terrorist attacks happening on the same day cannot be ordered; 
we thus consolidate them as an attack day. This will not be an issue, since this study focuses 
on daily data. The impact of attacks during market closure is captured by the empirical 
                                                     
1 The REER represents the price of local currency as the trade-weighted average of exchange 
rates among trade partners. The depreciation of currency is not always bad; it could decrease 
export prices and eventually restore competitiveness. The data source is Datastream. We do 
not conduct industry-level or firm-level analysis owing to the lack of comparative industry 
indices across the sample countries.  
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models. After removing attacks that do not have sufficient observations for the event study, 
we use 10,576 attack days in the subsequent analyses.  
<Insert Table 1 here> 
The daily terrorism index is calculated following Cukierman (2004), Eckstein and 
Tsiddon (2004), and Arin et al. (2008) as the natural logarithm of [e + the numbers of attacks, 
wounded, and killed in a day]. This index is used to categorize large-scale attacks and to 
represent the magnitude of the attacks. India, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and Russia 
are the five countries most heavily attacked, while Denmark, Finland, Taiwan, Croatia, and 
Norway suffered the least over the sample period.  
 
3. Methods 
This study employs six empirical methods to investigate the research questions. First, 
we test for equality of mean returns and variances between attack days and nonattack days. 
The alternative hypothesis is that attack days exhibit smaller returns or larger variances. We 
also test the next-day data after each terrorist attack against nonattack days.2 This method 
provides collective but only descriptive evidence about the adverse impact of the terrorist 
attacks, as it does not consider different circumstances in the financial markets before or after 
individual attacks.  
Second, we employ the event study method to compare the impact of attack and 
nonattack days as events. Unlike typical event studies, our study applies the same method not 
                                                     
2 Financial market returns are known to be approximately normal, so the need for alternative 
tests such as Bartlett tests is minimal. We use next-day data to capture the effects of attacks 
that may have happened during market closure. In the subsequent analyses, the effect of these 
attacks is captured by cumulative abnormal returns in the event studies and lagged variables 
in the regression models.  
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only to all attack days but also to all nonattack days in the dataset. We then compare the 
results for attack and nonattack days over the whole dataset and across different countries. To 
investigate the effect of attack size, we identify attacks with index scores in the top ten 
percent, that is, large-scale attacks, and investigate whether they make a stronger adverse 
impact on financial markets.  
Our event study approach estimates a mean-return model for an estimation window 
preceding individual terrorist attacks and identifies forecast errors within that window, 
including the attack day. Forecast errors are classified as abnormal returns, and then 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are calculated. We follow the method described by 
Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997)3 to test whether the sign of CAR is negative at a 5% 
significance level. We also test for equality in the variances of abnormal returns between 
estimation and event windows to find the impact of events on variances. The mean-return (rit) 
model for the event study is an autoregressive model of order 3, which uses three lags of 
returns as explanatory variables, with 100-day estimation and 6-day event windows, i.e., [-
100,-1] and [0,5]:4 
                                                     
3 We omit the technical details of event study as it is one of the most commonly used 
methods (Chesney et al., 2011). 
4 This pure autoregressive setup removes the difficulty of finding proper control variables. 
The choice of the number of lags follows Eldor and Melnick (2004). Tests with a model with 
5 lags produce very similar results. Six days is the midpoint of the window lengths tested by 
Chen and Siems (2004) and is also used by Chesney et al. (2011). Our test with a 3-day 
window generates a similar result except for the tests for equality of variance, where 3 days 
may not be sufficient. Panel A in Table A3 presents the results when we add the returns on 
the MSCI World Index to control for global market performance. The results are not 
dissimilar.    
  
9 
 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑡−𝑙
3
𝑙=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,        (1) 
where εit is the error term with zero mean and variance of σit2 at time t in market i. 
Third, in the first part of the meta-analysis, if strong adverse impact is not found in the 
original tests in the event studies, we adopt binomial tests to statistically test the marginal 
impact of attacks on the markets against nonattack days. A binomial distribution is defined as 
the probability (P) of a random variable X having a value of k: 
𝑃(𝑋 = 𝑘) = (
𝑁
𝑘
) 𝑝𝑘(1 − 𝑝)𝑁−𝑘 ,        (2) 
where N is the number of trials, k is the number of successes, and p is the probability of 
success for a single trial in a population.  
We use the binomial tests to evaluate two separate hypotheses. The first is that the 
probability of observing a significant adverse impact (i.e., decrease in return or increase in 
variance after an event) is identical (a) between attack and nonattack days or (b) between 
large-scale attacks and nonattack days. That is, attacks or even large-scale attacks do not 
increase the chance of adverse market conditions. The proportion of event days with adverse 
impact in nonattack days is defined as p, and then the probability of having at least k events 
with adverse impact in N attack days is calculated. The second hypothesis is that the 
probability of observing a significant adverse or favorable impact is 0.5 (p=0.5) regardless of 
whether an event is a nonattack, attack, or large-scale attack. In other words, there are equal 
chances of significant adverse (downward or more volatile) or favorable (upward or less 
volatile) movement even after attacks or large-scale attacks. Simply put, the probability 
differential between the two types of impact is zero. Both tests are done at the 5% 
significance level.   
Fourth, as the second part of the meta-analysis, we identify the determinants of the 
adverse impact of terrorist attacks using two different models, classifying adverse impacts 
according to the results from the event study. First, we use the extreme value model, a binary 
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dependent variable model, specifying attack days with significant adverse impact as one type 
of market response and those without adverse impact as the other type. Then we model the 
probability of adverse effect by the following cumulative distribution function of the extreme 
value distribution of Type I i.e. Gompit (Johnson, Kotz, & Balakrishnan, 1995). 
P(yi = 1|𝐱𝐢, 𝛅) = exp(−e
−𝐱𝐢
′𝛅) ,        (3) 
where the probability that a binary variable y takes on the value of 1 or 0 depends on the 
determinants x and the coefficient δ. This model assumes that the maximum impact of 
individual attacks is generated by an arbitrary distribution, of which asymmetry may provide 
a better fit than probit or logit models. Second, we use a linear least squares model where the 
CARs or their test statistics in the event studies are defined as the strength of the adverse 
impact and used as the dependent variable in a regression model.5  
The potential determinants of adverse impact (x) are selected from attack-side and 
recipient (or market)-side variables. The numbers of victims killed and wounded are expected 
to have a positive relationship with significant adverse impact. On the other hand, the 
market’s recent experience of similar attacks (calculated as the number of attacks, killed, or 
wounded in the past 100 days) is expected to have a negative relationship with the adverse 
impact, since recent experience may reduce the impact of the latest attack. Since attack-day 
returns may have a certain relationship with adverse impact, they are added along with the 
sign and size dummies.  
Fifth, as a robustness check for the findings from the meta-analysis of event studies, 
we apply a mean-volatility model to the observations belonging to each individual country. In 
this study, the autoregressive model above is accompanied by a popular asymmetric volatility 
                                                     
5 This second model is used for comparison purposes only, since the test statistics (t or F) 
have their own distributions, so typical postestimation statistical tests could be invalid.  
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model, the exponential GARCH (EGARCH) model (Nelson, 1991). We add the current and 
previous-day terrorism indices up to lag 5, which account for the size and the timing of 
attacks, to both return and variance equations. To assess the impact of a terrorist attack, we 
use the Wald test for the significance of the sum of the coefficients of the terrorism indices. 
This model can utilize all aggregated information regarding one country and analyze the 
impact of terrorist attacks on both mean return and volatility at the same time, but it ignores 
specific circumstances preceding individual attacks. 
𝑙𝑛(𝜎𝑖𝑡
2) =  𝜔𝑖 + 𝛾1𝑖 |
𝜀𝑡−1
𝜎𝑡−1
| + 𝛾2𝑖
𝜀𝑡−1
𝜎𝑡−1
+ 𝛾3𝑖 𝑙𝑛(𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
2 ) + ∑ 𝛾𝑙𝑖𝑇𝑖𝑡−𝑙
5
𝑙=0  ,   (4) 
where T is the terrorism index. 
Last, we apply the quantile regression model (Koenker & Bassett, 1978) to investigate 
whether different quantiles of market return react to attacks in different ways. The quantile 
regression model specifies the relationship between a specific quantile of market returns, i.e., 
their conditional medians instead of means, and the set of explanatory variables. The vector 
of regression estimators for quantile θ (η(θ)) is the solution to the following minimization 
problem: 
𝜂(𝜃)̂ = argmin𝜂(𝜃) (∑ 𝜃 |𝑟𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡
′
𝜂(𝜃)| +
𝑡:𝑟𝑡>𝑐𝑡
′
𝜂(𝜃)
∑ (1 − 𝜃) |𝑟𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡
′
𝜂(𝜃)|
𝑡:𝑟𝑡<𝑐𝑡
′
𝜂(𝜃)
) .
            (5) 
That is, the estimators minimize a weighted sum of the absolute deviation where rt is 
split at proportions θ below and (1- θ) above. 𝑐𝑡
′
 is a vector of the explanatory variables used 
in the event studies but includes 5 lags of the terrorism index. This study employs 
autoregressive variables, and thus it actually becomes a quantile autoregressive model 
(Koenker & Xiao, 2006) that is estimated by linear programming. The impact of terrorist 
attacks on a different θ can be tested by the significance of the sum of the coefficients of the 
terrorism index. Three quantiles, namely, 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9, are used in this study; the quantile 
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of 0.1 represents underperforming markets (the bottom 10% of observations in terms of 
return), and that of 0.9 represents well-performing markets. In addition, we use two slope 
equality tests (0.1 vs. 0.5 and 0.5 vs. 0.9) to confirm that the two extreme quantiles are 
different from the middle quantile. 
 
4. Results   
At the aggregate level, market returns do not differ statistically between attack days 
and nonattack days, as is shown by the tests for equality in mean return in both stock and 
foreign exchange markets (Table 2). At the level of individual countries, only 3 out of 72 
financial markets, Brazil, Taiwan, and the UK, show significant adverse impact on attack 
days. There is also only one market, Australia, that has statistically lower next-day returns 
after attacks (Atk+1) than after nonattack days. This descriptive evidence suggests that the 
adverse impact of terrorist attacks on market returns does not exist, particularly in the very 
short term. 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
On the other hand, market volatilities are relatively strongly affected by terrorist 
attacks (Table 3). However, the sign is mixed. The aggregated data show that terrorist attacks 
are associated with significantly higher volatility (U) on postattack days than on nonattack 
days in the stock markets, but lower volatility (D) on both attack and postattack days than on 
nonattack days in the foreign exchange markets. In addition, the individual financial markets 
have widely mixed signs and magnitudes of responses. Roughly equal numbers of markets 
show stabilizing and destabilizing effects of terrorist attacks, so the evidence here is not 
decisive. True, we do not control for different circumstances around individual attacks in the 
tests for equality, but the large number of observations may be sufficient to support the 
findings reasonably at the aggregated level. The evidence from these tests essentially 
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suggests that the effect of terrorist attacks is not dominantly adverse and could be marginal or 
absent.  
<Insert Table 3 here> 
The meta-analysis of the event studies on all attack and nonattack days confirms this 
suggestion (Table 4). First, the event studies alone do not produce a clear pattern, as the 
postevent cumulative abnormal returns are almost equally divided between significantly 
negative (23–26%) and positive returns (24–28%) in the individual stock and foreign 
exchange markets. Second, the binomial tests on the aggregated results show that only in the 
foreign exchange markets is there a significantly higher chance of adverse impact after 
terrorist attacks than after nonattack days (under NvA). Only some individual markets are 
more clearly and adversely affected by terrorist attacks, specifically the stock markets in 
France and Israel and the foreign exchange markets in China, India, Israel, and Thailand.  
Even larger-scale attacks do not produce statistical difference from nonattack days 
(Nv10). In terms of the probability of adverse effect on individual markets, the scant impact 
of 1,057 large-scale attacks contrasts with several previous findings that high-profile terrorist 
attacks significantly reduce returns (Charles & Darné, 2006; Chen & Siems, 2004; Hobbs, 
Schaupp, & Gingrich, 2016). In the aggregated data on the stock markets, we even observe a 
higher probability of upward movement after attacks. This may evidence a solid and quick 
recovery or even overshoot within the event windows, which may indicate the strong 
flexibility of the markets. The benchmark EGARCH models (EG) for each market do not 
show any more significant or dominant results than the event studies.  
<Insert Table 4 here> 
Nor do terrorist attacks, including large-scale attacks, increase volatility in the stock 
markets (Table 5). The only marginal evidence for adverse impact appears in the foreign 
exchange markets, where significantly higher volatilities are more probable after attacks than 
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after nonattack days. Even for individual markets, there is not much evidence for an adverse 
impact. Only Japan and Mexico show a higher chance of greater volatilities in stock markets 
after attacks, and only Austria, China, Germany, Greece, India, and Israel see volatilities 
increase in their foreign exchange markets. 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
The reason for this slightly stronger impact on the foreign exchange markets than the 
stock markets could be that the former is inherently more efficient or less resilient in 
responding to a shock. On the other hand, significant probability differentials (under DvU) 
tend to disappear when only large-scale attacks are tested. This could be because, particularly 
in less frequently attacked countries, subsample size becomes a bit too insufficient to identify 
the probability differential when significant impact on volatility is rarer than significant 
impact on mean return, as is the case in our sample. The benchmark EGARCH models 
present similar results: stronger adverse impact on foreign exchange markets, but generally 
weak and mixed impacts overall. 
In summary, terrorist attacks do not universally nor commonly have adverse impacts 
(Panel A in Table 6), but do have marginally significant impacts on foreign exchange 
markets. The evidence for this marginal adverse impact is clear only in aggregate data; 
individual attacks and markets often register heterogeneous results. Specifically, the 
marginally significant impacts take the form of higher probability of return decrease or 
volatility increase after attacks than after nonattack days, or significantly higher probability 
of having lower returns or larger variance than of having higher returns or smaller variance 
after attacks. Also, the adverse impact is stronger on volatilities than on mean returns.  
The evidence from the binomial distribution—that terrorist attacks marginally 
increase the probability of adverse impact in relation to nonattack days—is compatible with 
Chesney and colleagues’ (2011) evidence of a negative effect from the conditional 
  
15 
 
distribution of attack-day returns on previous-day ones. Both studies show that terrorist 
attacks are likely to affect the probability distribution, if anything, so most of the time the 
adverse impact is unlikely to happen.  
However, there could be alternative ways to reconcile our finding with those of other, 
more limited-scale studies. First, although terrorist attacks are known to have stronger 
impacts than natural disasters (Brounrn & Derwall, 2010; Chesney et al., 2011), market 
recovery could also be strong and quick (see Johnston & Nedelescu, 2005). Then, the adverse 
impact may not be easily captured by the event study method or regression models, which 
usually adopt event windows or lags of a few days. Second, similarly, financial markets could 
be essentially resilient to this type of shock. Investors may know or have experienced that 
unlike wars or coups, terrorist attacks are temporary and recovery follows soon after, so they 
may never respond at all, even at the beginning. However, this explanation is less likely, as 
past experience is relevant (see below and Table 7). Third, financial constraints such as short-
selling bans may prevent excessive market reaction to negative shocks.6 Fourth, the impact 
may be limited to certain industries (Apergis & Apergis, 2016; Hobbs et al., 2016; Kolaric & 
Schiereck, 2016). Fifth, the technical limitations of our methods may play a role here, but the 
benchmark models produce essentially very similar outcomes.  
Sixth, the development of the finance and banking sector over time could make some 
markets flexible enough not to suffer from terrorist attacks (Chen & Siems, 2004), or other 
country-specific factors could explain our findings, since the adverse impact appears 
particularly strong in several countries (Panel A in Table 6), such as China, India, and Israel. 
                                                     
6 Short-selling bans may not actually affect the market reaction to terrorist attacks. The meta-
analysis by year (Tables A1 and A2) and the comparison between countries that imposed 
short-selling bans and those that did not in 2008 and 2009 (Panels B and C in Table A3, 
respectively) do not show an apparent difference. 
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However, there are minimal cross-sectional correlations between these development 
factors—market capitalization/GDP, stock traded/GDP, and stock and foreign market 
turnovers (Panel B in Table 6)—and significant adverse impacts on return or variance (Panel 
C in Table 6), and none of these correlations are statistically significant. Only stock market 
turnover is moderately positively related (0.22) to adverse impact on foreign exchange 
markets. This could indicate that market liquidity or development may make foreign 
exchange markets more susceptible to terrorist attacks, possibly owing to the role of foreign 
investors.  
<Insert Table 6 here> 
Last, event-level characteristics may have affected the outcomes (Table 7). We 
investigate both attack-side and recipient-side factors using two different models (the extreme 
value and the linear least squares) and the results are much the same. First, the numbers of 
killed and wounded victims (Kld and Wnd) on the attack day have marginally significant but 
opposite impacts on stock returns on the following days: the number killed raises the 
probability of adverse impact, but the number wounded reduces it. Stock investors may 
weight deaths more heavily but get used to nonfatal attacks. However, this pattern is not 
evident in the foreign exchange markets. Second, the experience and severity of recent 
attacks (100T) decrease the likelihood of adverse impact on the foreign exchange markets. 
That is, investors in these markets discount the impact of the subsequent attacks. But this 
response is not shared by stock investors.   
Market returns on attack days (R) are more strongly related to the probability of 
adverse impact over subsequent days. Positive-return markets are less likely to suffer drops, 
while negative-return markets are more likely to be hit hard. On the other hand, attack-day 
returns are nonlinearly related to the likelihood of adverse impact on short-term market 
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volatility.7 Markets with either high or low returns are likely to be made more volatile by 
terrorist attacks, perhaps because they require a relatively large market adjustment, possibly 
mean-reverting. The results of the recipient-side variables here imply that the different 
quantiles of return distribution may react differently to attacks.  
<Insert Table 7 here> 
Finally, the quantile regression model of returns indeed shows that the impact of 
attacks is stronger in both tails of the return distribution (Table 8). In both stock and foreign 
exchange markets, both the top and the bottom 10% of observations are more strongly 
affected by the attacks than are the quantile of 0.5 and the benchmark volatility models. That 
is, the financial markets are more vulnerable when they are performing extremely well or 
extremely poorly. This finding is verified by the significant results of the slope equality tests, 
which show that the two extreme quantiles (0.9 and 0.1) react statistically differently from the 
median quantile (0.5). However, whether the impact is adverse or favorable varies across 
countries and markets, and thus it again confirms that terrorist attacks are weakly linked to 
adverse movements in financial markets in general. Similar patterns recur in the volatility 
models.  
<Insert Table 8 here> 
 
5. Conclusion 
In summary, unlike most of the previous literature, this study does not find strong and 
universal evidence that terrorist attacks adversely affect financial markets. Attack days and 
                                                     
7 Unlike the results for market returns, where the coefficient of the slope dummy (D×R) is 
smaller than that of the returns (R), in market variances, the relatively large negative 
coefficient of the slope dummy overcomes the positive coefficient of current returns (R) 
when R is negative.  
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even the following days do not have statistically smaller returns nor larger variances than 
nonattack days in the aggregated data. Adverse effects are seldom found even in individual 
markets.  
In foreign exchange markets the probability of decreasing returns and increasing 
variance after terrorist attacks are marginally significantly larger than after nonattack days. 
However, very few of the individual foreign exchange markets show this significant adverse 
impact; and even so, the signs are quite mixed. Nor do large-scale attacks have stronger 
adverse impacts.  
Whether an attack harms a financial market is determined by its magnitude and the 
market’s past experience of terrorist attacks and by the market conditions when the attack 
happens. For example, in stock markets (but not foreign exchange markets) the number of 
victims killed increases the chance of significant adverse impact while that of wounded 
victims decreases it. In foreign exchange markets (but not stock markets) recent attacks 
decrease that probability. And in both markets, down-trending markets are more likely to 
suffer from declines after attacks while up-trending markets are less likely to do so. Both 
extremely well and poorly performing markets are likely to have higher volatility after 
attacks.  
The findings of this study of a comprehensive dataset imply that we cannot normally 
expect a terrorist attack to decrease market returns or increase volatility. Its impact will at 
most marginally increase the probability of adverse impact compared with nonattack days. 
The probability of no response or a favorable market movement will still be fairly high. 
Country-specific or event-specific studies or studies based on a small sample will pick up 
only part of the true impact of terrorist attacks and may wrongly forecast their outcomes. 
Also, this study adds another dimension to the study of terrorist attacks. That is, if we are 
looking for significant impacts, we should focus on extremely well or poorly performing 
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markets. Our findings may also help the decision making of investors who worry about the 
impact of these supposedly random and adverse external events. 
On the other hand, it should be noted that we use event studies of individual attacks 
and nonattack days to identify adverse impacts from daily data, and then adopt meta-analysis 
to draw conclusions. This study may be still subject to the technical limitations of these 
approaches, despite our efforts to check robustness. The use of a lower or higher frequency 
dataset and/or other methods, like panel studies, could verify the findings of this study. Also, 
future research may need to focus on the conditional distribution and the extreme tails of 
returns to find more significant impact and identify determinants. 
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Table 1  
Descriptive statistics—financial markets and terrorist attacks. 
 
Panel A: Total or Average (T/A)                   
   Stock Forex Days Num Wnd Kld Tind 
 
     
0.0002 0.0000 10833 21847 49703 25509 1.072 
 Panel B: Individual Countries 
 ID Country Price index Start Obs Stock Forex Days Num Wnd Kld Tind 
 AT Austria ATX 11/04/1996 5146 0.0002 0.0000 14 17 12 1 1.001 
 AU Australia ASX200 11/04/1996 5146 0.0002 0.0000 38 41 33 8 1.004 
 BL Belgium BEL20 11/04/1996 5146 0.0002 0.0000 16 23 24 9 1.002 
 BR Brazil BOVESPA 02/01/2006 2609 0.0001 -0.0001 15 15 11 9 1.003 
 BU Bulgaria SOFIX 14/04/2006 2535 -0.0003 0.0000 11 12 30 8 1.002 
 CA Canada TSX Comp 11/04/1996 5146 0.0002 0.0000 41 42 51 8 1.004 
 CL Chile IGPA General 29/03/2007 2286 0.0001 -0.0001 43 54 30 3 1.009 
 CN China Shanghai A 03/06/2002 3544 0.0002 0.0001 83 109 947 786 1.038 
 CR Croatia CROBEX 30/01/2008 2067 -0.0005 0.0000 5 5 4 0 1.001 
 CZ Czech PX 10/04/2000 4104 0.0001 0.0001 15 16 25 2 1.002 
 DN Denmark OMXC20 11/04/1996 5146 0.0004 0.0000 7 8 8 2 1.001 
 FI Finland OMXH 11/04/1996 5146 0.0003 0.0000 10 11 2 9 1.001 
 FR France FAC40 11/04/1996 5146 0.0002 0.0000 370 689 390 186 1.040 
 GE Germany DAX30 11/04/1996 5146 0.0003 0.0000 141 176 192 22 1.015 
 GR Greece Athex Comp. 11/04/1996 5146 -0.0001 0.0000 373 573 71 10 1.033 
 HK Hong Kong Hang Seng 29/10/1996 5003 0.0001 0.0000 5 5 64 0 1.001 
 HU Hungary BUX 19/01/1999 4423 0.0003 0.0000 6 6 1 3 1.001 
 ID Indonesia IDX Comp. 14/05/2003 3297 0.0007 -0.0002 199 239 791 242 1.045 
 IN India NIFTY500 11/04/1996 5146 0.0004 -0.0001 2751 7414 19541 11088 1.738 
 IR Ireland ISEQ Overall 11/04/1996 5146 0.0002 0.0000 133 145 15 3 1.009 
 IS Israel TA125 09/04/2002 3583 0.0004 0.0000 505 959 2777 668 1.136 
 JP Japan NIKKEI225 11/04/1996 5146 0.0000 0.0000 44 53 3 0 1.003 
 ML Malaysia KLCI 31/10/2001 3697 0.0003 -0.0001 30 35 8 6 1.004 
 MX Mexico IPC 31/07/2001 3763 0.0005 -0.0002 72 89 284 134 1.015 
 NL Netherland AEX 11/04/1996 5146 0.0001 0.0000 20 20 17 9 1.002 
 NO Norway Oslo All 11/04/1996 5146 0.0004 0.0000 6 7 76 78 1.001 
 PH Philippines PSEi 16/01/2001 3903 0.0004 0.0000 1545 3450 5789 3203 1.428 
 RS Russia RTS 31/03/2003 3329 0.0002 -0.0003 890 1382 4681 2210 1.254 
 SA South Africa JSE All 11/04/1996 5146 0.0004 -0.0002 105 149 298 125 1.017 
 SP Spain IBEX35 11/04/1996 5146 0.0002 0.0000 380 614 2489 271 1.049 
 SZ Switzerland SMI 11/04/1996 5146 0.0002 0.0001 19 22 24 15 1.002 
 TK Turkey BIST100 27/01/2010 1547 0.0002 -0.0003 380 808 1954 897 1.255 
 TL Thailand Bangkok SET 15/09/1999 4252 0.0003 0.0000 1400 3108 6339 2167 1.369 
 TW Taiwan TAIEX 16/04/1999 4360 0.0000 0.0000 6 7 21 2 1.001 
 UK UK FTSE100 11/04/1996 5146 0.0001 0.0000 779 1064 1811 174 1.079 
 US US S&P500 11/04/1996 5146 0.0002 0.0000 376 480 890 3151 1.040 
 
 
Note: All data end on December 31, 2015. “Stock” and “Forex” represent the average of log 
returns of the stock index and the real effective exchange rates, respectively. “Num” is the 
total number of terrorism attacks. “Wnd” and “Kld” are the total numbers of victims wounded 
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and killed, respectively. “Tind” is the average value of the terrorism index, which is 
calculated as ln(e+Num+Wnd+Kld). The number of attack days used in the subsequent 
analysis is smaller than the number in this table because the event studies exclude any attack 
that does not have 100 daily observations (the estimation window) before the attack day. 
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Table 2  
Attack vs. nonattack days—tests for equality in mean returns. 
 
  Obs Stock Forex 
ID Total N A N A Atk D U Atk+1 D U N A Atk D U Atk+1 D U 
T/A 152241 141665 10576 0.0002 0.0004 1.5304     0.0776     0.0000 -0.0001 -1.4698     0.5925     
AT 5039 5026 13 0.0002 -0.0066 -1.1405 
  
-1.2336 
  
0.0000 -0.0004 -0.5835 
  
-0.9428 
  AU 5039 5003 36 0.0002 0.0029 1.3372 
  
-1.9233 * 
 
0.0000 0.0003 0.1813 
  
-0.0809 
  BL 5039 5023 16 0.0001 0.0023 0.5754 
  
-0.2050 
  
0.0000 0.0003 0.4302 
  
0.2776 
  BR 2503 2488 15 0.0001 -0.0096 -2.6454 * 
 
0.1231 
  
-0.0001 0.0004 0.1706 
  
-0.1555 
  BU 2429 2418 11 -0.0003 0.0027 1.0859 
  
2.1118 
 
* 0.0000 -0.0014 -1.1324 
  
-0.8046 
  CA 5039 4999 40 0.0002 -0.0012 -0.6681 
  
-0.4461 
  
0.0000 -0.0015 -1.3071 
  
0.1076 
  CL 2180 2137 43 0.0001 0.0012 0.9707 
  
0.4243 
  
-0.0001 0.0008 0.8327 
  
0.2893 
  CN 3438 3356 82 0.0002 0.0040 2.5460 
 
* -0.9538 
  
0.0001 0.0001 -0.0378 
  
1.1803 
  CR 1961 1957 4 -0.0004 0.0033 1.2332 
  
0.1215 
  
0.0000 -0.0007 -0.3433 
  
1.0865 
  CZ 3998 3983 15 0.0001 0.0012 0.5176 
  
-0.8686 
  
0.0001 -0.0003 -0.4093 
  
-0.6848 
  DN 5039 5032 7 0.0004 0.0056 3.0835 
 
* 1.7626 
 
* 0.0000 -0.0009 -0.9450 
  
-0.5744 
  FI 5039 5030 9 0.0003 -0.0032 -0.7753 
  
-1.1794 
  
0.0000 0.0014 1.0077 
  
-0.8501 
  FR 5039 4701 338 0.0001 0.0013 1.6771 
 
* 0.1037 
  
0.0000 -0.0002 -1.5880 
  
0.6502 
  GE 5039 4916 123 0.0003 -0.0006 -0.6324 
  
-0.7240 
  
0.0000 0.0004 1.7760 
 
* -1.0044 
  GR 5039 4670 369 -0.0002 0.0007 0.7658 
  
-0.1464 
  
0.0000 0.0002 1.5315 
  
-1.5634 
  HK 4897 4892 5 0.0001 -0.0154 -1.1763 
  
0.4462 
  
0.0000 -0.0012 -0.8262 
  
-0.2078 
  HU 4317 4311 6 0.0003 0.0085 4.5627 
 
* -1.4267 
  
0.0000 -0.0005 -0.3227 
  
-0.4530 
  ID 3191 2997 194 0.0007 -0.0004 -1.0184 
  
-0.3775 
  
-0.0002 -0.0003 -0.3769 
  
0.1429 
  IN 5039 2331 2708 0.0008 0.0001 -1.5588 
  
-0.0771 
  
-0.0001 -0.0001 -0.1475 
  
-0.4241 
  IR 5039 4908 131 0.0001 0.0019 1.8377 
 
* 1.0897 
  
0.0000 -0.0003 -1.0757 
  
0.6853 
  IS 3477 2994 483 0.0003 0.0005 0.2306 
  
-0.8628 
  
0.0000 0.0001 0.3264 
  
-0.4999 
  JP 5039 4999 40 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0349 
  
0.4627 
  
0.0000 -0.0006 -0.7431 
  
-0.0115 
  ML 3591 3561 30 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.2848 
  
1.2281 
  
-0.0001 -0.0002 -0.2288 
  
1.4862 
  MX 3657 3589 68 0.0006 -0.0012 -1.3556 
  
0.2872 
  
-0.0001 -0.0023 -1.2302 
  
0.7492 
  NL 5039 5021 18 0.0001 -0.0007 -0.2284 
  
0.0514 
  
0.0000 -0.0002 -0.4198 
  
1.2026 
  NO 5039 5033 6 0.0003 0.0027 0.6863 
  
-0.8588 
  
0.0000 0.0027 1.6937 
 
* -0.3387 
  PH 3797 2270 1527 0.0004 0.0004 0.0750 
  
0.8134 
  
-0.0001 0.0001 1.8328 
 
* 1.2187 
  RS 3223 2359 864 -0.0001 0.0008 1.0724 
  
-0.8378 
  
-0.0003 -0.0003 -0.2109 
  
0.2616 
  SA 5039 4944 95 0.0004 -0.0005 -0.7502 
  
0.4315 
  
-0.0002 -0.0005 -0.3551 
  
0.5113 
  SP 5039 4682 357 0.0002 0.0002 0.0676 
  
-1.6152 
  
0.0000 0.0000 0.1404 
  
0.0058 
  SZ 5039 5022 17 0.0002 0.0018 0.9028 
  
1.9110 
 
* 0.0001 -0.0009 -1.4503 
  
-0.4934 
  TK 1441 1068 373 0.0002 0.0002 0.0640 
  
0.2742 
  
-0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0656 
  
0.9209 
  TL 4146 2752 1394 -0.0001 0.0009 2.5189 
 
* 0.4658 
  
0.0000 0.0001 0.9881 
  
0.2249 
  TW 4254 4248 6 0.0000 -0.0131 -1.5257 
  
-1.6398 
  
0.0000 -0.0020 -1.6781 * 
 
-1.1877 
  UK 5039 4268 771 0.0001 0.0000 -0.3735 
  
-0.2995 
  
0.0001 -0.0003 -2.2961 * 
 
1.8383 
 
* 
US 5039 4677 362 0.0002 0.0000 -0.3698 
  
1.1830 
  
0.0001 -0.0001 -0.6875 
  
2.2752 
 
* 
        Sig   19%     11%     Sig   14%     6%     
        D%   3%     3%     D   6%     0%     
        U%   17%     8%     U   8%     6%     
 
Note: Statistical differences between attack (“A”) and nonattack (“N”) days are tested by 
equality of mean tests. The test statistics are presented under “Atk” for attack vs. nonattack 
days and “Atk+1” for attack+1 vs. nonattack days. “D” and “U” indicate whether the 
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alternative hypothesis is that the statistics for attack days are smaller or larger against the null 
hypothesis of equality, respectively. * shows rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% 
significance level. “T/A” is total or average, and “Obs” is the number of observations. “Sig” 
is the proportion of rejection in the individual markets. “D%” and “U%” show the proportion 
of rejection in the individual markets for each alternative hypothesis.   
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Table 3  
Attack vs. nonattack days—tests for equality in variances. 
 
  Obs Stock Forex 
ID Total N A N A Atk D U Atk+1 D U N A Atk D U Atk+1 D U 
T/A 152241 141665 10576 2.0E-04 2.0E-04 1.0146     1.0320   * 2.0E-05 1.9E-05 0.9283 *   0.9265 *   
AT 5039 5026 13 1.9E-04 4.6E-04 2.3595   * 5.4517   * 1.6E-06 6.1E-06 3.7433   * 1.6145     
AU 5039 5003 36 9.6E-05 1.5E-04 1.5828   * 0.9585     4.4E-05 1.0E-04 2.3259   * 0.9514     
BL 5039 5023 16 1.5E-04 2.3E-04 1.5222     1.3017     3.2E-06 6.4E-06 2.0055   * 1.9004   * 
BR 2503 2488 15 3.1E-04 2.0E-04 0.6499     0.5662     1.1E-04 1.2E-04 1.1577     1.0233     
BU 2429 2418 11 1.6E-04 8.2E-05 0.5064     0.2441 *   6.2E-06 1.7E-05 2.7499   * 0.4411     
CA 5039 4999 40 1.2E-04 1.7E-04 1.3576     1.9257   * 2.6E-05 5.6E-05 2.1691   * 1.5585   * 
CL 2180 2137 43 7.6E-05 5.5E-05 0.7196     0.5556 *   4.7E-05 4.6E-05 0.9977     0.6749     
CN 3438 3356 82 2.7E-04 1.8E-04 0.6850 *   1.3999   * 8.0E-06 1.6E-05 2.0131   * 1.1456     
CR 1961 1957 4 1.6E-04 3.7E-05 0.2355     2.0711     4.2E-06 1.4E-05 3.3072   * 0.4863     
CZ 3998 3983 15 2.0E-04 6.4E-05 0.3263 *   1.4568     1.6E-05 1.5E-05 0.9219     0.6182     
DN 5039 5032 7 1.6E-04 2.0E-05 0.1247 *   0.1204 *   3.8E-06 7.1E-06 1.8507     0.4562     
FI 5039 5030 9 3.3E-04 1.9E-04 0.5596     1.5967     5.1E-06 1.7E-05 3.3858   * 1.4037     
FR 5039 4701 338 2.2E-04 1.7E-04 0.7954 *   0.7134 *   3.5E-06 3.6E-06 1.0206     1.2007   * 
GE 5039 4916 123 2.3E-04 2.3E-04 0.9659     0.9479     5.1E-06 4.9E-06 0.9562     1.4642   * 
GR 5039 4670 369 3.6E-04 4.6E-04 1.2859   * 1.2418   * 5.8E-06 3.7E-06 0.6319 *   0.8387 *   
HK 4897 4892 5 2.7E-04 8.7E-04 3.1678   * 0.4867     5.9E-06 1.2E-05 1.9424     0.9522     
HU 4317 4311 6 2.4E-04 1.9E-05 0.0815 *   1.2252     3.4E-05 1.0E-05 0.2961     0.2651     
ID 3191 2997 194 1.9E-04 1.9E-04 1.0327     1.3448   * 3.0E-05 2.8E-05 0.9259     0.7811 *   
IN 5039 2331 2708 2.7E-04 2.1E-04 0.7973 *   0.7936 *   1.6E-05 2.3E-05 1.4896   * 1.5377   * 
IR 5039 4908 131 1.8E-04 1.2E-04 0.6570 *   0.7250 *   8.6E-06 7.9E-06 0.9133     0.8309     
IS 3477 2994 483 1.3E-04 1.5E-04 1.1083     0.8572 *   2.0E-05 2.7E-05 1.3165   * 1.4267   * 
JP 5039 4999 40 2.3E-04 1.8E-04 0.8138     3.1306   * 4.4E-05 2.9E-05 0.6715     1.8302   * 
ML 3591 3561 30 5.4E-05 2.8E-05 0.5198 *   1.4706     1.3E-05 1.9E-05 1.4956   * 2.7505   * 
MX 3657 3589 68 1.5E-04 1.2E-04 0.7670     2.1866   * 5.1E-05 2.0E-04 3.8807   * 1.9897   * 
NL 5039 5021 18 2.1E-04 2.6E-04 1.2004     0.8832     4.6E-06 3.7E-06 0.7908     0.8494     
NO 5039 5033 6 1.8E-04 7.0E-05 0.3818     0.5581     2.0E-05 1.5E-05 0.7557     0.5781     
PH 3797 2270 1527 1.5E-04 1.5E-04 0.9884     0.8529 *   1.2E-05 1.2E-05 0.9980     1.1536   * 
RS 3223 2359 864 4.9E-04 4.3E-04 0.8908 *   0.9044 *   7.7E-05 2.4E-05 0.3179 *   0.2919 *   
SA 5039 4944 95 1.5E-04 1.4E-04 0.9127     0.8080     8.5E-05 5.4E-05 0.6319 *   1.1174     
SP 5039 4682 357 2.2E-04 2.1E-04 0.9417     0.8144 *   2.4E-06 2.9E-06 1.2203   * 1.4414   * 
SZ 5039 5022 17 1.5E-04 5.6E-05 0.3812 *   0.9940     2.1E-05 7.1E-06 0.3436 *   0.5429     
TK 1441 1068 373 2.2E-04 1.9E-04 0.8776     0.9548     3.0E-05 3.7E-05 1.2295   * 1.4123   * 
TL 4146 2752 1394 2.0E-04 1.4E-04 0.6690 *   0.7436 *   9.2E-06 8.3E-06 0.9000 *   0.8621 *   
TW 4254 4248 6 1.9E-04 4.5E-04 2.3038   * 3.8444   * 6.7E-06 8.4E-06 1.2464     0.2328     
UK 5039 4268 771 1.5E-04 1.1E-04 0.7210 *   0.7841 *   1.7E-05 1.7E-05 0.9691     1.1254   * 
US 5039 4677 362 1.5E-04 1.7E-04 1.1308     0.8484 *   9.6E-06 7.9E-06 0.8182 *   0.8148 *   
        Sig   47%     58%     Sig   56%     50%     
        D%   33%     36%     D   17%     14%     
        U%   14%     22%     U   39%     36%     
 
Note: Statistical differences between nonattack days (N) and attack days (A) are tested by 
equality of variance tests. The test statistics are presented under “Atk” for attack vs. 
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nonattack days and “Atk+1” for attack+1 vs. nonattack days. “D” and “U” indicate whether 
the alternative hypothesis is that the statistics in attack days are smaller or larger against the 
null hypothesis of equality, respectively. * shows rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% 
significance level. “T/A” is total or average, and “Obs” is the number of observations. “Sig” 
is the proportion of rejection in the individual markets. “D%” and “U%” show the proportion 
of rejection in the individual markets for each alternative hypothesis.   
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Table 4  
Meta-analysis of the event studies—mean returns.  
          Stock  Forex 
  Obs N A 10 NvA 
Nv 
10 
DvU 
EG 
N A 10 NvA 
Nv 
10 
DvU 
EG ID Total N A 10 D U D U D U D U D U A 10 D U D U D U D U D U A 10 
T/A 152241 141665 10576 1057 35735 35270 2737 2527 238 291       * D U 36001 36344 2713 2669 278 267 *           
          0.25 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.28               0.25 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.25               
AT 5039 5026 13   1326 1277 1 6                   1268 1319 5 6                   
AU 5039 5003 36 1 1294 1288 12 8 1 0               1310 1247 14 9 0 1               
BL 5039 5023 16 1 1229 1232 3 2 0 0               1322 1355 3 3 0 0               
BR 2503 2488 15   629 670 2 6                   603 594 4 4                   
BU 2429 2418 11 1 573 587 3 2 0 1               578 601 3 5 0 0               
CA 5039 4999 40 1 1311 1217 8 14 1 0               1342 1337 5 13 1 0         U   D 
CL 2180 2137 43   536 547 10 13                   555 545 11 8                   
CN 3438 3356 82 27 837 786 19 19 8 4               828 868 36 11 2 14 *     * D U U 
CR 1961 1957 4   457 483 2 0                   501 498 2 1                 U 
CZ 3998 3983 15 1 1037 955 4 5 1 0               977 998 5 2 0 1               
DN 5039 5032 7   1283 1235 2 2                   1318 1363 3 3                   
FI 5039 5030 9   1288 1273 0 4                 D 1312 1322 3 1                   
FR 5039 4701 338 8 1156 1198 111 78 2 3 *       D     1243 1245 88 98 3 2               
GE 5039 4916 123 3 1261 1248 36 32 0 1               1290 1310 23 44 2 0   *     U   D 
GR 5039 4670 369   1199 1178 103 90                 U 1183 1219 87 103                   
HK 4897 4892 5 1 1283 1285 1 0 0 0               1292 1271 0 3 1 0               
HU 4317 4311 6   1121 1086 3 0                   1049 1052 0 1                   
ID 3191 2997 194 7 739 678 43 44 0 6           U   691 685 49 49 0 3               
IN 5039 2331 2708 527 665 550 698 664 119 144             D 585 584 695 684 148 139 *   *         
IR 5039 4908 131   1234 1217 37 31                   1311 1301 38 41                   
IS 3477 2994 483 46 753 748 144 115 9 18 *     * D     758 711 137 125 11 10 *             
JP 5039 4999 40   1293 1235 8 14                 D 1223 1345 12 10                   
ML 3591 3561 30   844 854 7 5                   863 899 7 8                   
MX 3657 3589 68 3 862 892 16 22 2 1               895 843 16 17 0 1               
NL 5039 5021 18 1 1244 1249 4 3 0 1               1332 1350 1 5 0 0               
NO 5039 5033 6 1 1273 1197 1 0 0 0               1288 1229 2 1 0 0             U 
PH 3797 2270 1527 159 547 537 393 349 32 37             U 529 559 364 353 37 32               
RS 3223 2359 864 58 572 562 218 202 17 13               553 602 202 214 18 7           D   
SA 5039 4944 95 5 1217 1259 21 23 2 3               1262 1244 23 20 0 0               
SP 5039 4682 357 9 1179 1211 101 82 1 5               1238 1261 100 97 4 4               
SZ 5039 5022 17 1 1237 1228 5 5 0 1               1200 1259 3 5 1 0               
TK 1441 1068 373 44 279 266 103 81 6 12               266 279 98 96 11 11               
TL 4146 2752 1394 136 693 673 331 320 32 38               683 688 376 334 35 35 *             
TW 4254 4248 6 1 1067 1059 1 3 1 0               1056 1082 1 3 1 0               
UK 5039 4268 771 8 1076 1088 192 193 1 1               1085 1082 202 204 1 4               
US 5039 4677 362 7 1141 1222 94 90 3 2               1212 1197 95 88 2 3               
 
Note: This table presents the results of a meta-analysis of event studies on nonattack days (N), 
attack days (A), and large-scale (10% largest) attack days (10), with a 100-day estimation and 
a 6-day event window. The main figures show the number of days with significant decrease 
(D) or increase (U) of the market returns due to an attack. NvA compares nonattack days with 
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attack days by testing the probability that decrease (D) or increase (U) in return is equal in 
both groups. Nv10 does the same but with large-scale attacks instead. * indicates significance 
at the 5% level. DvU tests whether the probabilities of observing D and U are equal or one of 
them is favored in each group of event days, at the 5% significance level. “Obs” is the 
number of observations. “T/A” is either total or average. The numbers in italics show the 
proportion of significant event days (D or U) in each group (N/A/10). EG shows the results 
from the EGARCH model. The results by year are presented in Table A1 in the appendix.  
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Table 5  
Meta-analysis of the event studies—variances. 
     
Stock Forex 
  Obs N A 10 NvA 
Nv 
10 
DvU 
EG 
N A 10 NvA 
Nv 
10 
DvU 
EG ID Total N A 10 D U D U D U D U D U A 10 D U D U D U D U D U A 10 
T/A 152241 145481 10576 1057 15362 16439 1283 1195 113 125 *       D   14087 15218 1150 1206 109 128 * *   *     
          0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12               0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.12               
AT 5039 5026 13   532 604 1 2                   417 538 1 5       *           
AU 5039 5003 36 1 475 559 2 5 0 0               443 551 2 5 0 0               
BL 5039 5023 16 1 533 613 3 2 0 0               378 517 3 3 0 0               
BR 2503 2488 15   220 264 0 2                   417 316 3 2                   
BU 2429 2418 11 1 446 319 2 1 0 0               624 293 3 1 1 0               
CA 5039 4999 40 1 486 563 2 7 0 0               350 494 8 4 0 0 *             
CL 2180 2137 43   284 267 7 2                   204 219 5 7                   
CN 3438 3356 82 27 361 425 7 6 2 4               316 317 3 13 1 4   *     U     
CR 1961 1957 4   239 179 1 0                   159 214 0 1                   
CZ 3998 3983 15 1 511 449 2 2 0 0               513 455 2 2 0 0             U 
DN 5039 5032 7   540 586 1 1                   414 528 0 2                   
FI 5039 5030 9   488 546 1 0                   439 486 0 1                   
FR 5039 4701 338 8 429 560 34 37 1 2               356 509 27 36 1 3       *       
GE 5039 4916 123 3 539 573 9 11 0 1               416 511 11 20 0 0   *           
GR 5039 4670 369   562 561 39 48                   449 459 26 47       *     U   U 
HK 4897 4892 5 1 446 504 0 0 0 0               374 496 2 1 0 1               
HU 4317 4311 6   432 415 0 0                   578 500 0 0                   
ID 3191 2997 194 7 446 371 31 31 0 2             D 542 377 30 27 1 1               
IN 5039 2331 2708 527 323 318 353 312 60 55             D 274 242 358 312 58 64 * *     D   U 
IR 5039 4908 131   472 560 10 15                   347 478 9 19             U     
IS 3477 2994 483 46 321 291 52 57 1 6               336 288 37 62 4 7   *     U   U 
JP 5039 4999 40   476 566 6 10       *           524 567 2 6                   
ML 3591 3561 30 3 451 442 3 6 0 2               296 415 0 5 0 1         U   U 
MX 3657 3589 68   404 432 4 14       *     U   U 364 394 3 11             U     
NL 5039 5021 18 1 491 605 4 3 0 0               369 522 2 0 1 0               
NO 5039 5033 6 1 577 574 1 0 0 0               493 526 0 0 0 0               
PH 3797 2270 1527 159 266 232 205 152 21 12 *       D   D 194 233 154 157 17 13 *             
RS 3223 2359 864 58 308 291 113 95 9 8               382 301 136 110 3 9               
SA 5039 4944 95 5 580 633 11 14 1 2               506 570 12 11 1 2             D 
SP 5039 4682 357 9 451 566 29 44 0 2               379 505 21 36 1 1         U     
SZ 5039 5022 17 1 554 602 0 0 0 0             D 588 520 0 1 0 0             D 
TK 1441 1068 373 44 110 112 34 36 2 5               116 129 29 35 4 4               
TL 4146 2752 1394 136 359 308 202 145 15 19         D   D 309 324 164 147 15 17             D 
TW 4254 4248 6 1 344 456 0 1 0 0               502 520 0 0 0 0               
UK 5039 4268 771 8 443 520 71 84 0 3               330 422 71 88 0 1               
US 5039 4677 362 7 463 573 43 50 1 2               389 482 26 29 1 0               
 
Note: This table presents the results of a meta-analysis of event studies on nonattack days (N), 
attack days (A), and large-scale (10% largest) attack days (10), with a 100-day estimation and 
a 6-day event window. The main figures show the number of days with significant decrease 
(D) or increase (U) of market variances due to an attack. NvA compares nonattack days with 
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attack days by testing whether the probabilities of decrease (D) or increase (U) in return are 
equal in both groups. Nv10 does the same but with large-scale attacks instead. * indicates 
significance at the 5% level. DvU tests whether the probabilities of observing D and U are 
equal or one of them is favored in each group of event days, at the 5% significance level. 
“Obs” is the number of observations. “T/A” is either total or average. The numbers in italics 
show the proportion of significant event days (D or U) in each group (N/A/10). EG shows the 
results from the EGARCH model. The results by year are presented in Table A2 in the 
appendix.   
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Table 6  
Adverse impact by country and its correlation with market/economic factors. 
Panel A: Summary of adverse impact  
 
Panel B: Market/economic factors 
ID SM SV EM EV Sum    ID CAP TRD TOV FOV 
AT 0 0 0 1 1    AT 107.62 81.05 75.17 0.29 
AU 0 0 0 0 0    AU 28.34 11.34 39.32 1.86 
BL 0 0 0 0 0    BL 66.00 23.75 39.71 0.35 
BR 0 0 0 0 0    BR 49.09 26.04 54.47 0.31 
BU 0 0 0 0 0    BU 15.21 2.43 19.04 0.03 
CA 0 0 0 0 0    CA 112.86 79.92 72.70 1.32 
CL 0 0 0 0 0    CL 103.28 14.73 13.78 0.11 
CN 0 0 1 1 2    CN 51.90 92.36 183.01 1.12 
CR 0 0 0 0 0    CR 38.59 2.04 5.41   
CZ 0 0 0 0 0    CZ 20.76 11.79 65.43 0.06 
DN 0 0 0 0 0    DN 55.75 32.06 56.29 1.55 
FI 0 0 0 0 0    FI 134.73 117.69 91.12 0.21 
FR 1 0 0 0 1    FR 77.96 62.79 82.75 2.78 
GE 0 0 0 1 1    GE 45.40 55.31 126.78 1.78 
GR 0 0 0 1 1    GR 41.16 21.00 46.50 0.02 
HK 0 0 0 0 0    HK 795.92 443.09 54.82 6.71 
HU 0 0 0 0 0    HU 20.75 15.18 72.56 0.05 
ID 0 0 0 0 0    ID 33.56 10.82 34.88 0.08 
IN 0 0 1 1 2    IN 76.06 48.37 75.05 0.52 
IR 0 0 0 0 0    IR 51.42 6.55 13.50 0.03 
IS 1 0 1 1 3    IS 71.89 27.24 37.71 0.12 
JP 0 1 0 0 1    JP 77.77 88.35 111.97 6.13 
ML 0 0 0 0 0    ML 136.87 41.88 30.75 0.12 
MX 0 1 0 0 1    MX 30.49 8.11 27.27 0.31 
NL 0 0 0 0 0    NL 90.49 94.33 108.59 1.30 
NO 0 0 0 0 0    NO 52.16 41.01 77.82 0.61 
PH 0 0 0 0 0    PH 55.22 9.29 16.62 0.05 
RS 0 0 0 0 0    RS 40.63 30.19 47.73 0.69 
SA 0 0 0 0 0    SA 211.39 57.31 27.11 0.32 
SP 0 0 0 0 0    SP 81.27 107.61 133.77 0.51 
SZ 0 0 0 0 0    SZ 216.01 134.29 1.09 2.39 
TK 0 0 0 0 0    TK 28.72 43.62 158.31 0.34 
TL 0 0 1 0 1    TL 66.55 52.24 79.75 0.17 
TW 0 0 0 0 0    TW 159.24 98.01 62.67   
UK 0 0 0 0 0    UK 120.84 94.35 78.15 36.94 
US 0 0 0 0 0    US 124.65 222.97 186.51 19.53 
T/A 2 2 4 6 14    T/A 96.96 64.14 66.89 2.61 
               
     
      
   Panel C: Correlation table 
      
   
 
CAP TRD TOV FOV 
      
   SM -0.042 -0.062 -0.046 -0.042 
      
   SV -0.082 -0.052 0.004 0.022 
      
   EM -0.084 -0.045 0.197 -0.112 
      
   EV -0.110 -0.062 0.218 -0.132 
      
   T/A -0.080 -0.055 0.093 -0.066 
 
Note: Panel A summarizes the number of adverse impacts discovered in each country in the 
meta-analysis (Tables 4 and 5). The prefixes S and E are for stock and foreign exchange 
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markets, respectively. M and V indicate mean return and variances, respectively. Panel B 
shows 15-year (2000–2015) average values of stock market capitalization per GDP (CAP, 
in %), the value of stock traded per GDP (TRD, in %), stock market turnover ratio (TOV), 
and the daily average distribution of foreign exchange turnover (FOV, in %). Panel C is the 
table of correlation between the variables in Panels A and B. No correlation is significant at 
the 5% level. T/A is total or average.   
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Table 7  
The determinants of the adverse impact of terrorist attacks.  
  Return Variance 
Stock EV 
 
CAR 
 
T 
 
EV 
 
CAR2 
 
F   
c -0.4907 *** -0.0013   -0.2699 ** -1.0941 *** 0.0006 *** 0.7293 *** 
Kld -0.0075   0.0015 * 0.1017 * 0.0462   0.0000   0.0031   
Wnd -0.0363 * -0.0010 * -0.0525   -0.0149   0.0001   -0.0044   
100T 0.0105   0.0004   -0.0254   -0.0258   0.0000   -0.0649   
Trend 0.0029   0.0000   0.0100 * -0.0004   0.0000 *** 0.0057   
Rt -19.6403 
*** -1.2051 *** -69.4705 *** 20.0243 *** 0.1269 *** 34.6726 *** 
Dt 0.2419 
*** 0.0028 *** 0.6635 *** -0.0221   0.0003 ** -0.0198   
Dt×Rt -2.6762   0.4003 
*** 23.9018 *** -59.5709 *** -0.2185 *** -104.6672 *** 
R2 0.0763   0.1672   0.1435   0.0996   0.0792   0.0813   
             
  Return Variance 
Forex EV 
 
CAR 
 
T 
 
EV 
 
CAR2 
 
F 
 
c -0.2934 *** 0.0006   -0.0922   -0.8572 *** 0.0000   1.7341 *** 
Kld -0.0108   0.0002   0.0524   -0.0074   0.0000   -0.1020   
Wnd 0.0001   -0.0002   -0.0577   0.0058   0.0000   0.0061   
100T -0.1019 *** -0.0005   -0.1247   -0.1520 *** 0.0000   -0.2853 * 
Trend -0.0036   0.0000   0.0050   0.0017   0.0000   -0.0183   
Rt -52.6821 
*** -1.2150 *** -212.2467 *** 81.6690 *** 0.0412 *** 116.0863 *** 
Dt 0.2469 
*** 0.0005 * 0.6623 *** -0.0490   0.0000 * -0.5959 *** 
Dt×Rt -25.0917 
** 0.4588 *** 59.3903 *** -188.9171 *** -0.0734 *** -433.6373 *** 
R2 0.0691   0.1517   0.1199   0.0793   0.0806   0.0208   
 
Note: This table presents the estimation results of the binary extreme value (EV) and least 
squares models (CAR, CAR2, T and F) of the adverse impact of terrorist attacks. The 
dependent variables are the measures of significant adverse effect from the event studies. EV 
adopts a dummy for significant adverse impact on return or variance. CAR uses the 
negativity of 6-day cumulative abnormal returns and CAR2 uses their squares as a proxy for 
variance. T and F use the test statistics used in the event studies. Kld and Wnd are the 
numbers of killed and wounded victims. 100T is the average of the terrorism index over 100 
days preceding an attack. R is market returns and Rt-1 is previous-day returns. D is a dummy 
for negative returns. D×R is an interaction term (or a slope dummy). R2 in EV is McFadden 
R2, which is calculated from likelihood values. R2 in the other models are the adjusted R2. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  
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Table 8  
Impact on the different quantiles of return. 
  Stock  Forex 
ID EG 
 
0.1 
 
0.5 
 
0.9 
 
15 59 EG 
 
0.1 
 
0.5 
 
0.9 
 
15 59 
AT -0.0213   -0.1136 D -0.0277   0.1516 U     -0.0006   -0.0090 D -0.0005   0.0051 U     
AU -0.0009   0.0078   -0.0040   0.0302   X X 0.0020   0.0094 U 0.0024   0.0178 U     
BL 0.0095   0.0209 U 0.0079   0.0213       -0.0003   0.0008   -0.0006   -0.0012   X   
BR -0.0219   0.0017   -0.0235 D -0.0732 D     -0.0058   0.0011   -0.0108 D 0.0064     X 
BU 0.0021   0.0156   0.0067 U -0.0142   X   -0.0005   0.0026   -0.0006   -0.0030 D X   
CA -0.0043   -0.0428   -0.0077   -0.0025       -0.0042 D -0.0002   -0.0059   -0.0086 D     
CL -0.0022   0.0059   -0.0022   -0.0070   X   0.0007   -0.0009   0.0051   -0.0093       
CN 0.0011   0.0035   -0.0011   -0.0048 D     0.0010 U 0.0008   0.0012 U 0.0017 U     
CR 0.0235   -0.0311 D 0.0078   0.0861 U X X 0.0106 U -0.0156 D -0.0001   0.0106 U X   
CZ -0.0090   0.0094   0.0018   0.0057       0.0031   0.0105 U 0.0076 U -0.0054 D   X 
DN 0.0121   -0.0327   0.0287 U 0.1171 U X X -0.0029   -0.0234 D -0.0007   0.0125 U X X 
FI -0.0340 D -0.0622 D -0.0457   -0.0580 D X X 0.0017   -0.0143 D -0.0002   0.0090 U X X 
FR 0.0018   0.0097 U 0.0019   -0.0035       -0.0004   -0.0005   -0.0003   -0.0005       
GE 0.0005   0.0002   0.0022   -0.0001   X   -0.0013 D -0.0053 D -0.0008   -0.0004     X 
GR 0.0137 U -0.0101   0.0028   0.0410 U     -0.0003   -0.0011   -0.0001   0.0016 U     
HK -0.0040   0.0078 U -0.0109 D -0.0139 D X X -0.0012   -0.0070 D -0.0122 D -0.0019 D X X 
HU 0.0060   0.0153   -0.0091   -0.0262   X   -0.0034   -0.0077   -0.0072   -0.0109 D   X 
ID -0.0011   -0.0016   -0.0018   0.0012   X   -0.0009   -0.0031 D 0.0000   0.0036   X X 
IN -0.0008 D 0.0024 U -0.0006   -0.0036 D   X 0.0000   -0.0009 D -0.0001   0.0006 U     
IR -0.0042   0.0187   0.0002   0.0004       -0.0015   0.0017   0.0001   -0.0023       
IS -0.0001   -0.0010   0.0004   0.0002       0.0001   -0.0018 D 0.0000   0.0007       
JP -0.0316 D -0.0614 D -0.0137   -0.0031     X 0.0085   -0.0008   0.0062   0.0024       
ML 0.0016   0.0159   -0.0009   0.0032       0.0031   -0.0138   0.0014   0.0130       
MX -0.0049   -0.0065   -0.0029   0.0111 U X   0.0000   0.0035   0.0005   -0.0022   X X 
NL 0.0078   0.0452 U 0.0179   0.0095 U   X 0.0002   -0.0085   -0.0001   0.0011   X   
NO -0.0032   0.0159 U -0.0051 D -0.0245 D X X 0.0011 U 0.0076 U 0.0010 U -0.0053 D X X 
PH 0.0013 U 0.0032 U 0.0003   -0.0012   X   0.0002   0.0007 U 0.0000   0.0000   X   
RS -0.0010   -0.0002   0.0006   -0.0025       0.0001   0.0017 U 0.0000   -0.0014 D   X 
SA -0.0001   0.0069   -0.0003   -0.0075 D     0.0008   0.0075   -0.0002   -0.0086 D   X 
SP 0.0013   -0.0030   0.0008   0.0035       0.0001   -0.0008   0.0000   0.0008     X 
SZ 0.0017   0.0169   0.0157 U 0.0106       -0.0023   -0.0009   -0.0008   -0.0010     X 
TK -0.0004   0.0023 U 0.0002   -0.0006       0.0001   -0.0024 D 0.0003   0.0013     X 
TL -0.0007   0.0042 U 0.0004   -0.0040 D X X 0.0000   0.0006 U -0.0001   -0.0002   X X 
TW -0.0403   -0.0829 D -0.0327 D -0.0111   X   -0.0019   0.0015   -0.0020 D -0.0023     X 
UK -0.0002   0.0026   0.0011   -0.0039       0.0001   -0.0004   0.0004   0.0004       
US 0.0004   0.0002   0.0002   0.0047       0.0002   0.0015 U 0.0007 U -0.0001       
Sig 0.14   0.39   0.19   0.39   0.42 0.28 0.14   0.47   0.19   0.44   0.33 0.47 
D% 0.08   0.14   0.11   0.22       0.06   0.28   0.08   0.22       
U% 0.06   0.25   0.08   0.17       0.08   0.19   0.11   0.22       
 
Note: This table summarizes the estimation results of the quantile regression model. The 
results from the mean-volatility model (EG) are also presented as a benchmark for mean 
return. The numbers are the sum of the coefficients of the terrorism indices from t=0 and t=-5. 
“U” and “D” after the estimates indicate whether the estimates are significant in increasing or 
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decreasing the corresponding statistics at the 5% significance level, respectively. In the 
quantile regression models, “0.1,” “0.5,” and “0.9” are the quantiles. “15” indicates the 
results of the slope equality tests of the current-day terrorist index between quantiles 0.1 and 
0.5; “59” indicates the results of the tests between quantiles 0.5 and 0.9. “X” indicates 
significant difference at the 5% level. “Sig” in the bottom panel indicates the percentage of 
countries that are significantly affected by terrorist attacks. “D%” and “U%” are the 
percentages of significantly negatively and positively affected countries, respectively.  
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Appendix 
Table A1  
Meta-analysis of the event studies—mean returns by year. 
          Stock 
 
Forex 
  Obs N A 10 NvA Nv10 DvU 
 
N A 10 NvA Nv10 DvU 
ID Total N A 10 D U D U D U D U D U A 10 
 
D U D U D U D U D U A 10 
T 152241 141665 10576 1057 35270 35735 2527 2737 238 291               36344 36001 2669 2713 278 267             
          0.25 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.23 0.28             
 
0.26 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.25             
1996 1653 1512 141 11 299 538 30 57 4 5       * U   
 
460 337 31 30 1 3             
1997 5165 4837 328 45 1289 1370 81 93 13 10             
 
1238 1385 93 103 12 19       *     
1998 5220 5052 168 19 1277 1364 44 50 5 4             
 
1260 1141 45 31 1 5             
1999 5453 5164 289 24 1244 1261 62 80 5 6             
 
1255 1109 69 80 8 8   *         
2000 6046 5722 324 29 1652 1305 99 80 8 11             
 
1591 1639 94 85 14 7     *       
2001 6422 6091 331 43 1374 1678 74 93 8 12             
 
1664 1464 88 81 21 7     *     D 
2002 7131 6867 264 45 1970 1567 55 65 10 12             
 
1706 1862 67 72 15 11             
2003 7731 7417 314 60 1625 1880 63 93 13 18   *     U   
 
1885 1934 96 81 18 14 *           
2004 8122 7875 247 54 1859 2068 52 69 9 18             
 
2069 2003 53 56 8 10             
2005 8060 7703 357 59 1910 2126 76 103 5 23       * U U 
 
2003 2008 98 97 15 15             
2006 8304 7903 401 58 1699 2040 91 106 11 13             
 
1982 1991 105 123 15 15   *         
2007 8710 8299 411 57 2191 2138 106 117 15 20             
 
2120 2221 107 94 17 13             
2008 9048 8281 767 68 2544 2095 201 203 20 17             
 
2396 2397 224 218 16 23             
2009 9135 8381 754 64 1655 1927 140 174 8 17         U   
 
1860 1702 160 177 12 16   *         
2010 9277 8543 734 49 1958 2107 174 170 12 13             
 
2243 2164 190 173 15 9             
2011 9360 8649 711 40 2424 2170 194 162 9 11             
 
2281 2102 185 176 13 10             
2012 9396 8488 908 64 1808 2011 181 244 11 22   *   * U U 
 
1921 2309 215 236 12 17             
2013 9396 8385 1011 81 2206 2049 281 266 21 17             
 
2153 2115 242 257 19 19             
2014 9396 8329 1067 94 2282 2090 241 267 22 19             
 
2220 2128 251 281 21 25             
2015 9216 8167 1049 93 2004 1951 282 245 29 23 *             2037 1990 256 262 25 21             
Note: This table presents the results of a meta-analysis of event studies on nonattack days (N), 
attack days (A), and large-scale (10% largest) attack days (10), with a 100-day estimation and 
a 6-day event window. The main figures show the number of days with significant decrease 
(D) or increase (U) of the market returns due to an attack. NvA compares nonattack days with 
attack days by testing whether the probabilities of decrease (D) or increase (U) in return are 
equal in both groups. Nv10 does the same but with large-scale attacks instead. * indicates 
significance at the 5% level. DvU tests whether the probabilities of observing D and U are 
equal or one of them is favored in each group of event days, at the 5% significance level. 
“Obs” is the number of observations. “T” is total. The numbers in italics show the proportion 
of significant event days (D or U) in each group (N/A/10).  
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Table A2  
Meta-analysis of the event studies—variances by year. 
 
 
    
Stock  Forex 
  
 
N A 10 NvA Nv10 DvU  N A 10 NvA Nv10 DvU 
Year Obs N A 10 D U D U D U D U D U A 10  D U D U D U D U D U A 10 
T 152241 141665 10576 1057 15362 16439 1283 1195 113 125 *       D    14087 15218 1150 1206 109 128 * *   *     
          0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12              0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.12             
1996 1653 1512 141 11 97 157 6 31 1 4   *   * U    176 190 34 16 4 2 *   *   D   
1997 5165 4837 328 45 331 733 32 50 7 8 *   * * U    347 629 29 45 4 5         U   
1998 5220 5052 168 19 711 794 16 20 2 4              760 576 34 7 2 0 *       D   
1999 5453 5164 289 24 539 329 37 23 5 2         D    541 403 19 20 1 1             
2000 6046 5722 324 29 635 833 41 58 4 4              340 718 23 31 2 2             
2001 6422 6091 331 43 655 613 49 39 6 5 *            523 447 41 23 6 7 *       D   
2002 7131 6867 264 45 724 867 32 22 6 2              714 788 24 28 2 4             
2003 7731 7417 314 60 724 492 19 26 1 4              511 665 23 35 5 5             
2004 8122 7875 247 54 735 741 43 26 10 4 *   *   D    782 752 21 25 6 3             
2005 8060 7703 357 59 595 815 31 32 6 5              499 531 44 20 7 8 *     * D   
2006 8304 7903 401 58 1057 987 73 49 9 8 *       D    879 599 36 57 6 10   *     U   
2007 8710 8299 411 57 759 1271 62 48 8 11 *     *      724 1077 81 61 10 7 *   *       
2008 9048 8281 767 68 941 1764 110 138 5 12 *       U    517 1582 45 167 4 21   *   * U U 
2009 9135 8381 754 64 1219 222 136 23 6 4 *       D    1342 361 130 52 12 3   *     D D 
2010 9277 8543 734 49 1152 812 104 93 5 10   *          790 962 75 97 5 6             
2011 9360 8649 711 40 683 1412 45 89 1 8       * U U  1017 1104 66 81 2 4             
2012 9396 8488 908 64 1245 517 114 41 6 0         D D  908 473 86 67 6 6   *         
2013 9396 8385 1011 81 867 989 100 181 9 12   *     U    892 1113 121 155 7 13   *     U   
2014 9396 8329 1067 94 808 1145 109 109 9 6              808 1348 116 116 10 10             
2015 9216 8167 1049 93 885 946 124 97 7 12         D    1017 900 102 103 8 11             
 
Note: This table presents the results of a meta-analysis of event studies on nonattack days (N), 
attack days (A), and large-scale (10% largest) attack days (10), with a 100-day estimation and 
a 6-day event window. The main figures show the number of days with significant decrease 
(D) or increase (U) of the market variances due to an attack. NvA compares nonattack days 
with attack days by testing whether the probabilities of decrease (D) or increase (U) in return 
are equal in both groups. Nv10 does the same but with large-scale attacks instead. * indicates 
significance at the 5% level. DvU tests whether the probabilities of observing D and U are 
equal or one of them is favored in each group of event days, at the 5% significance level. 
“Obs” is the number of observations. “T” is total. The numbers in italics show the proportion 
of significant event days (D or U) in each group (N/A/10). 
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Table A3  
Meta-analysis of the event studies—alternative specification and short-selling. 
 
  
   
Stock Forex 
 
  Obs Return Variance Return Variance 
  ID Total N A D U DvU D U DvU D U DvU D U DvU 
Panel A T 152241 141665 10576 2324 2502 U 1522 1223 D 2635 2692   1132 1216 U 
All         0.22 0.24   0.14 0.12   0.25 0.25   0.11 0.11   
 
AT 5039 5026 13 5 3   1 3   6 4   1 5   
 
AU 5039 5003 36 8 7   1 4   11 12   2 7   
 
BL 5039 5023 16 2 8   3 2   3 3   2 3   
 
BR 2503 2488 15 6 2   1 2   4 5   3 2   
 
BU 2429 2418 11 1 3   2 1   5 2   2 1   
 
CA 5039 4999 40 10 6   1 7 U 7 7   5 3   
 
CL 2180 2137 43 10 9   8 4   9 12   3 6   
 
CN 3438 3356 82 15 19   11 10   11 35 U 3 13 U 
 
CR 1961 1957 4 1 2   1 1   1 2   0 1   
 
CZ 3998 3983 15 2 5   3 1   1 6   3 2   
 
DN 5039 5032 7 3 2   1 1   2 2   0 2   
 
FI 5039 5030 9 4 1   1 1   1 3   0 3   
 
FR 5039 4701 338 77 89   41 40   93 84   30 38   
 
GE 5039 4916 123 27 27   10 16   43 24 D 12 18   
 
GR 5039 4670 369 85 99   37 51   104 84   35 47   
 
HK 4897 4892 5 0 0   0 0   3 0   1 1   
 
HU 4317 4311 6 0 1   0 0   2 0   1 0   
 
ID 3191 2997 194 34 46   35 26   50 48   32 30   
 
IN 5039 2331 2708 628 635   428 326 D 676 683   357 309 D 
 
IR 5039 4908 131 23 36   17 6 D 38 35   9 19 U 
 
IS 3477 2994 483 109 117   56 66   126 131   39 63 U 
 
JP 5039 4999 40 13 7   7 11   7 10   3 5   
 
ML 3591 3561 30 7 6   4 5   7 6   0 6 U 
 
MX 3657 3589 68 16 18   9 8   15 17   3 12 U 
 
NL 5039 5021 18 4 4   4 3   5 2   1 1   
 
NO 5039 5033 6 0 4   1 1   0 3   1 0   
 
PH 3797 2270 1527 327 357   240 165 D 368 383   143 167   
 
RS 3223 2359 864 190 204   144 92 D 221 194   131 103 D 
 
SA 5039 4944 95 12 21   10 14   19 23   10 13   
 
SP 5039 4682 357 84 88   33 33   90 102   20 33 U 
 
SZ 5039 5022 17 6 2   1 0   3 3   1 1   
 
TK 1441 1068 373 68 88   46 36   96 108   30 41   
 
TL 4146 2752 1394 291 300   222 148 D 322 354   166 149   
 
TW 4254 4248 6 3 1   0 1   4 1   0 0   
 
UK 5039 4268 771 175 197   105 85   202 210   62 83 U 
  US 5039 4677 362 78 88   38 53   80 94   21 29   
Panel B T 3090 2914 176 38 48   23 20   43 47   16 18   
Ban AU 515 511 4 0 1   0 0   0 1   0 0   
 
CA 515 506 9 2 2   0 2   2 2   0 2   
 
GR 515 422 93 25 23   8 14   27 18   13 9   
 
NL 515 513 2 0 1   1 0   0 0   1 0   
 
UK 515 470 45 8 13   11 3 D 11 18   1 6   
  US 515 492 23 3 8   3 1   3 8   1 1   
Panel C T 2575 2475 100 23 27   5 24 U 28 29   6 25 U 
No Ban CZ 515 512 3 0 1   1 0   0 1   1 0   
 
FI 515 514 1 0 1   0 0   1 0   0 0   
 
HK 515 514 1 0 0   0 0   1 0   0 1   
 
HU 515 512 3 0 1   0 0   1 0   1 0   
  IS 515 423 92 23 24   4 24 U 25 28   4 24 U 
  
42 
 
 
Note: This table presents the results of a meta-analysis of event studies on nonattack (N) and 
attack (A) days, with a 100-day estimation and a 6-day event window. The mean-return 
model now additionally employs the event-day return on the MSCI World Index. In all panels, 
the main figures show the number of days with significant decrease (D) or increase (U) of the 
market return or variances due to an attack. DvU tests whether the probabilities of observing 
D and U are equal or one of them is favored in each group of event days, at the 5% 
significance level. “Obs” is the number of observations. “T” is total. The numbers in italics 
show the proportion of significant event days (D or U). Panels B and C show the results with 
countries that imposed short-selling bans in 2008 and lifted them in 2009 (Panel B) and those 
that did not (Panel C), respectively. The classification of the two groups follows Beber and 
Pagano (2013). 
 
